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ABSTRACT
The rapid growth of small Internet connected devices, known as the Internet of Things
(IoT), is creating a new set of challenges to create secure, private infrastructures. This
paper reviews the current literature on the challenges and approaches to security and
privacy in the Internet of Things, with a strong focus on how these aspects are handled
in IoT middleware. We focus on IoT middleware because many systems are built
from existing middleware and these inherit the underlying security properties of the
middleware framework. The paper is composed of three main sections. Firstly, we
propose a matrix of security and privacy threats for IoT. This matrix is used as the basis
of a widespread literature review aimed at identifying requirements on IoT platforms
and middleware. Secondly, we present a structured literature review of the available
middleware and how security is handled in these middleware approaches. We utilise
the requirements from the first phase to evaluate. Finally, we draw a set of conclusions
and identify further work in this area.
Subjects Computer Networks and Communications, Embedded Computing, Real-Time and
Embedded Systems, Security and Privacy, World Wide Web and Web Science
Keywords Internet of Things, Security, Privacy, IoT, Middleware, Survey
INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) was originally coined as a phrase by Kevin Ashton in
1990 (Ashton, 2009), with reference to ‘‘taggable’’ items that used Radio Frequency
Identification Devices (RFID) to become electronically identifiable and therefore amenable
to interactions with the Internet. With the ubiquity of cheap processors and System-on-
Chip based devices, the definition has expanded to include wireless and Internet-attached
sensors and actuators, including smartmeters, home automation systems, Internet-attached
set-top-boxes, smartphones, connected cars, and other systems that connect the physical
world to the Internet either by measuring it or affecting it.
There are a number of definitions of IoT. For the purposes of this work, we will define
it in the following way. An IoT device is a system that contains either sensors or actuators
or both and supports connection to the Internet either directly or via some intermediary.
A sensor is a subcomponent of a device that measures some part of the world, allowing
the device to update Internet and Cloud systems with this information. A sensor may be as
simple as a button (e.g., Amazon Dash Button), but more complex sensors widely deployed
include weather sensors (barometers, anemometers, thermometers), accelerometers and
GPS units, light sensors, air quality sensors, people-counters, as well as medical sensors
(blood sugar, heart rate, etc.), industrial sensors (production line monitoring, etc.) and
many more. Actuators are electronically controlled systems that affect the physical world.
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These includes lights, heaters, locks, motors, pumps, relays and so forth. Therefore the
IoT is the network of such devices together with the Internet systems that are designed to
interoperate and communicate with those devices, including the websites, cloud servers,
gateways and so forth.
The number of IoT devices has grown rapidly, with a recent estimate suggesting that
there were 12.5 billion Internet attached devices in 2010 and a prediction of 50 billion
devices by 2020 (Evans 2011). This brings with it multiple security challenges:
• These devices are becoming more central to people’s lives, and hence the security is
becoming more important.
• Many IoT devices collect Personally Identifiable Information (PII) which may lead to
potential privacy concerns.
• Because devices can affect the physical world, there are potential attacks that may have
greater impact than purely virtual attacks.
• These devices, due to size and power limitations, may not support the same level of
security that we would expect from more traditional Internet connected systems.
• The sheer scale and number of predicted devices will create new challenges and require
new approaches to security.
Because of the pervasive and personal nature of IoT, privacy and security are important
areas for research. In 2016, more than 100,000 IoT devices were conjoined into a hostile
botnet named Mirai that attacked the DNS servers of the east coast of the US (Wei, 2016).
The total attack bandwidth of this system was measured at more than 600 Gbps. In fact,
the number of devices attacked was a small number compared to the potential: previous
research (National Vulnerability Database, 2014) has identified several million devices that
are available for attack.
Therefore there is a strong motivation to find approaches to improve and enhance the
security and privacy of the IoT. Many IoT projects use existing platforms, also known as
middleware to build upon. The Oxford English Dictionary (2017) defines middleware as:
Software that acts as a bridge between an operating system or database and applications,
especially on a network.
Such systems can either improve security or reduce it: if the platform is built with
privacy and security inmind then such systems can embed best-practices and enable system
designers to rapidly create secure systems. If platforms are built without security, or security
is added as an after-thought, then it is possible that not only does the platform encourage the
creation of insecure, privacy-negating systems, but also that it may make it more difficult
to add security when problems are found. The creation of systems with security and
privacy as a key design principle is known as Privacy By Design (PBD) (Cavoukian, 2008).
The rest of this work is laid out as follows. In ‘Approach and Methodology, we outline
the research approach and methodology used for the survey. In ‘Matrix Evaluation’ we
evaluate threats for security and privacy using a matrix model. In ‘Three Layer Privacy
Model’, we use a three-layer model to evaluate IoT privacy. From these models we present
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a set of requirements for IoT privacy and security in ‘Summary of the Review of Security
Issues’. In ‘Secure Middleware for the Internet of Things’ we outline the structured survey
of IoTmiddleware systems. In ‘Secured Systems’, we identify 19 secure middleware systems
and look at the security and privacy characteristics of each, using the previously identified
requirements as a guide. In ‘Summary of IoT Middleware Security’ we summarise the
findings of the survey. Finally, in ‘Discussion’ we look at the conclusions, contributions
and further work in this area.
APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY
In order to understand the security threats against the Internet of Things, we need to take
an approach to classifying threats. The most widely used ontology of security threats is the
Confidentiality Integrity Availability (CIA) triad (Pfleeger & Pfleeger, 2002) which has been
extended over the years. The extended ontology is referred to as the ‘‘CIA Plus’’ (CIA+)
model (Simmonds, Sandilands & Van Ekert, 2004). In the course of reviewing the available
literature and approaches to IoT security, we have created a proposed expansion of the
existing framework that we believe works better in the IoT space. In particular, we propose
a new ontology based on a matrix of evaluation where we look at each of the classic security
challenges in three different aspects: device/hardware, network, and cloud/server-side. In
some cells in this matrix, we have not identified any areas where the IoT space presents new
challenges: in other words, whilst the domain space covered by these cells contains security
challenges, those challenges are no different from existing Web and Internet security
challenges in that domain. In those cells we can say that the challenges are ‘‘unchanged’’.
In other cells we specifically identify those challenges that are significantly modified by the
unique nature of the Internet of Things.
In addition to the matrix, we utilise the Three Layer Privacy Model from Spiekermann &
Cranor (2009) to explore privacy concerns in more detail.
Together, the matrix and three-layer model are then used to inform a set of requirements
on IoTmiddleware. In the second part of this work, we use a structured surveymethodology
to identify a set of middleware designed to support IoT systems. We start with a specific
set of search terms used against a meta-search engine to search across multiple databases.
Then we reviewed the abstracts of each identified paper and from these we identified a
number of middleware systems. Once the middleware systems we identified, we did not
confine ourselves to the identified papers but also reviewed Open Source code, architecture
documents and other resources. We evaluate each of the middleware systems against the
identified requirements from the matrix evaluation.
The contributions of this paper are:
• A matrix model for evaluating threats to IoT systems.
• A structured literature review of security of middleware systems for IoT.
MATRIX EVALUATION
Table 1 shows the matrix we will use for evaluating security challenges. In each cell we
summarise the main challenges that are different in the IoT world or at least exacerbated
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Table 1 Matrix of security challenges for the IoT.
Security characteristic A. Device/Hardware B. Network C. Cloud/Server-side
1. Confidentiality A1. Hardware attacks B1. Encryption with low capa-
bility devices
C1. Privacy data leaks finger-
printing
2. Integrity A2. Spoofing; Lack of attestation B2. Signatures with low capa-
bility devices Sybil attacks
C2. No common device
identity
3. Availability A3. Physical attacks; B3. Unreliable networks,
DDoS, radio jamming
C3. DDoS (as usual)
4. Authentication A4. Lack of UI, default passwords,
hardware secret retrieval
B4. Default passwords, lack of
secure identities
C4. No common device iden-
tity, insecure flows
5. Access Control A5. Physical access; Lack of local
authentication
B5. Lightweight distributed
protocols for access control
C5. Inappropriate use of tradi-
tional ACLs, device shadow
6. Non-Repudiation A6. No secure local storage; No at-
testation, forgery
B6. Lack of signatures with low
capability devices
C6. Lack of secure identity and
signatures
by the challenges of IoT compared to existing Internet security challenges. We will explore
each cell in the matrix in detail below. Each of the cells is given a designation from A1 to
C6 and these letters are used as a key to refer to the cells below.
The three aspects (Hardware/Device, Network, Cloud/Server) were chosen because as
we read the available literature these areas became clear as a way of segmenting the unique
challenges within the context of the IoT. These form a clear logical grouping of the different
assets involved in IoT systems. We will provide a quick overview of each area before we
look in detail at each cell of the matrix.
Device and Hardware
IoT devices have specific challenges that go beyond those of existing Internet clients.
These challenges come from: the different form factors of IoT devices, from the power
requirements of IoT devices, and from the hardware aspects of IoT devices. The rise of
cheap mobile telephony has driven down the costs of 32-bit processors (especially those
based around the ARM architecture (Furber, 1996)), and this is increasingly creating lower
cost microcontrollers and System-on-Chip (SoC) devices based on ARM. However, there
are still many IoT devices built on 8-bit processors, and occasionally, 16-bit (Vieira et al.,
2003). In particular the open source hardware platform Arduino (Arduino, 2015) supports
both 8-bit and 32-bit controllers, but the 8-bit controllers remain considerably cheaper
and at the time of writing are still widely used.
The challenges of low-power hardware mean that certain technologies are more or less
suitable. In the details of each cell below we will address specific details as they pertain to
security. In addition, there are specific protocols and approaches designed for IoT usage
that use less power and are more effective. In Gligorić, Dejanović & Krčo (2011) there is a
comparison of eXtensible Markup Language (XML) parsing with binary alternatives. The
processing time on a constrained device is more than a magnitude slower using XML,
and that the heap memory used by XML is more than 10 Kb greater than with binary
formats. These improvements result in a 15% saving in power usage in their tests. XML
security standards such as XML Encryption and the related WS-Encryption standard
have significant problems in an IoT device model. For example, any digital signature
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in XML Security needs a process known as XML Canonicalisation (XML C14N). XML
Canonicalisation is a costly process in both time and memory. Binna (2008) shows that
the memory usage is more than 10× the size of the message in memory (and XML
messages are already large for IoT devices). We looked for any work on implementing
WS-Security on Arduino, ESP8266 or Atmel systems (which are common targets for IoT
device implementations) without success. XML performance on small devices can be
improved using Efficient XML Interchange (EXI), which reduces network traffic (Levä,
Mazhelis & Suomi, 2014).
Network
IoT devices may use much lower power, lower bandwidth networks than existing
Internet systems. Cellular networks often have much higher latency and more ‘‘dropouts’’
than fixed networks (Chakravorty, Cartwright & Pratt, 2002). The protocols that are used
for the Web are often too data-intensive and power-hungry for IoT devices. Network
security approaches such as encryption and digital signatures are difficult and in some
cases impractical in small devices. New low-power, low-bandwidth networks such as
LoRaWan (https://www.lora-alliance.org/) are gaining significant traction.
There have been some limited studies comparing the power usage of different protocols.
In Levä, Mazhelis & Suomi (2014) there is comparison of using Constrained Application
Protocol (CoAP)with EXI againstHyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP), showing efficiency
gains in using CoAP. In Nicholas (2012), MQTT over TLS is shown to use less power than
HTTP over TLS in several scenarios. In Thangavel et al. (2014), there is a comparison
of network traffic between CoAP and Message Queueing Telemetry Transport (MQTT)
showing that each performs better in different scenarios, with similar overall performance.
This is an area where more study is clearly needed, but we can draw conclusions that
traditional protocols such as Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP)/HTTP are unsuited
to IoT usage.
Cloud/Server-Side While many of the existing challenges apply here, there are some
aspects that are exacerbated by the IoT for the server-side or cloud infrastructure. These
include: the often highly personal nature of data that is being collected and the requirement
to manage privacy; the need to provide user-managed controls for access; and the lack of
clear identities for devices making it easier to spoof or impersonate devices.
A1: Device confidentiality
Hardware devices have their own challenges for security. There are systems that can
provide tamper-proofing and try to minimise attacks, but if an attacker has direct access
to the hardware, they can often break it in many ways. For example, there are devices
that will copy the memory from flash memory into another system (known as NAND
Mirroring ). Code that has been secured can often be broken with Scanning Electron
Microscopes. Skorobogatov from Cambridge University has written a comprehensive
study (Skorobogatov, 2005) of many semi-invasive attacks that can be done on hardware.
Another common attack is called a side-channel attack (Yan, 2008; Lomne et al., 2011)
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where the power usage or other indirect information from the device can be used to
steal information. This means that it is very difficult to protect secrets on a device from a
committed attacker.
A specific outcome of this is that designers should not rely on obscurity to protect
devices. A clear example of this was the Mifare card used as the London Oyster card and for
many other authentication and smart-card applications. The designers created their own
cryptographic approach and encryption algorithms. Security researchers used a number
of techniques to break the obscurity, decode the algorithm, find flaws in it and create a
hack that allowed free transport in London as well as breaking the security on a number
of military installations and nuclear power plants (Garcia et al., 2008). Similarly, relying
on the security of a device to protect a key that is used across many devices is a significant
error. For example, the encryption keys used in DVD players and XBoX gaming consoles
(Steil, 2005) were broken meaning that all devices were susceptible to attack.
A related issue to confidentiality of the data on the device is the challenges inherent in
updating devices and pushing keys out to devices. The use of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
requires devices to be updated as certificates expire. The complexity of performing updates
on IoT devices is harder, especially in smaller devices where there is no user interface.
For example, some devices need to be connected to a laptop in order to perform updates.
Others need to be taken to a dealership or vendor. The distribution and maintenance of
certificates and public-keys onto embedded devices is complex (Watro et al., 2004). In Park
& Kang (2015) a novel approach to supporting mutual authentication in IoT networks is
proposed. However, this model assumes that each device has a secure, shared key (called
kIR) already deployed and managed into every device. As discussed above, ensuring this
key is not compromised is a challenge, as the authors admit: ‘‘However, further research is
required to realize the secure sharing of kIR.’’
In addition, sensor networksmay be connected intermittently to the network resulting in
limited or no access to the Certificate Authority (CA). To address this, the use of threshold
cryptographic systems that do not depend on a single central CA has been proposed (Yi &
Kravets, 2002), but this technology is not widely adopted: in any given environment this
would require many heterogeneous Things to support the same threshold cryptographic
approach. This requires human intervention and validation, and in many cases this is
another area where security falls down. For example, many situations exist where security
flaws have been fixed but because devices are in homes, or remote locations, or seen
as appliances rather than computing devices, updates are not installed (Hill, 2013). The
Misfortune Cookie (Point, 2014) demonstrates that even when security fixes are available,
somemanufacturers do notmake them available to customers and continue to ship insecure
systems. It is clear from the number of publicised attacks (McDaniel & McLaughlin, 2009;
Khurana et al., 2010; Hill, 2013) that many device designers have not adjusted to the
challenges of designing devices that will be connected either directly or indirectly to
the Internet.
A further security challenge for confidentiality and hardware is the fingerprinting of
sensors or data from sensors. In Bojinov et al. (2014) it has been shown that microphones,
accelerometers and other sensors within devices have unique ‘‘fingerprints’’ that can
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1The same search was repeated on the 10th
Feb 2017. The number of repositories
for ‘‘Arduino’’ and ‘‘Encryption’’ had
grown to 21, while for ‘‘Arduino’’ and
‘‘HTTP’’ had reached 941, demonstrating
that support for encryption is growing
slowly.
uniquely identify devices. Effectively there are small random differences in the physical
devices that appear during manufacturing that can be identified and used to recognise
individual devices across multiple interactions.
B1: Network confidentiality
The confidentiality of data on the network is usually protected by encryption of the data.
There are a number of challenges with using encryption in small devices. Performing
public key encryption on 8-bit microcontrollers has been enhanced by the use of Elliptic
Curve Cryptography (ECC) (Koblitz, 1987;Miller, 1986). ECC reduces the time and power
requirements for the same level of encryption as an equivalent Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman
public key cryptography (RSA) public-key encryption (Rivest, Shamir & Adleman, 1978) by
an order of magnitude (Gura et al., 2004; Sethi, 2012; Sethi, Arkko & Keranen, 2012): RSA
encryption on constrained 8-bit microcontrollers may take minutes to complete, whereas
similar ECC-based cryptography completes in seconds. However, despite the fact that ECC
enables 8-bit microcontrollers to participate in public-key encryption systems, in many
cases it is not used. We can speculate as to why this is: firstly, as evidenced by Sethi, Arkko
& Keranen (2012), the encryption algorithms consume a large proportion of the available
ROM on small controllers. Secondly, there is a lack of standard open source software. For
example, a search that we carried out (on the 21st April 2015) of the popular open source
site Github for the words ‘‘Arduino’’ and ‘‘Encryption’’ revealed 10 repositories compared
to ‘‘Arduino’’ and ‘‘HTTP’’ which revealed 467 repositories. These 10 repositories were
not limited to network level encryption. However, recently an open source library for
AES on Arduino (Landman, 2015) has made the it more effective to use cryptography on
Atmel-based hardware.1
While ECC ismaking it possible for low-power devices to bemore efficient in performing
cryptography operations, in 2015 the NSA made an unprecedented warning against ECC
(https://threatpost.com/nsas-divorce-from-ecc-causing-crypto-hand-wringing/115150/).
We don’t yet know why, as of the time of writing. There are differing theories. One known
issue with both Prime Numbers and Elliptic Curves is Quantum Computing. In Quantum
computers, instead of each bit being 0 or 1, each qubit allows a superposition of both 0 and
1, allowingQuantum computers to solve problems that are very slow for classical computers
in a fraction of the time. At the moment general purpose Quantum computers are very
simple and confined to laboratories, but they are increasing in power and reliability. In 1994,
Peter Shor identified an algorithm for Quantum Computers (Shor, 1999) that performs
prime factorization in polynomial time, which effectively means that most existing Public
Key Cryptography (PKC) will be broken once sufficiently powerful Quantum computers
come online. Given that most Quantum Computers are as yet ineffective, there is some
concern that maybe the problem with ECC is actually based on classical computing, but
this is all speculation. One thing that we do know is that ECC is much easier to do on
IoT devices, and especially on low-power, 8- or 16-bit systems. Therefore this warning is
worrying for IoT developers.
Another key challenge in confidentiality is the complexity of the most commonly used
encryption protocols. The standard Transport Layer Security (TLS) (Dierks, 2008) protocol
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can be configured to use ECC, but even in this case the handshake process requires a
number of message flows and is sub-optimal for small devices as documented in Koschuch,
Hudler & Krüger (2010). Perelman & Ersue (2012) has argued that using TLS with Pre
Shared Key (PSK) improves the handshake. PSK effectively allows TLS to use traditional
symmetric cryptography instead of Public Key (assymetric) cryptography. However, they
fail to discuss in any detail the significant challenges with using PSK with IoT devices: the
fact that either individual symmetric keys need to be deployed onto each device during
the device manufacturing process, or the same key re-used. In this case there is a serious
security risk that a single device will be broken and thus the key will be available.
Some IoT devices use User Datagram Protocol (UDP) instead of the more commonly
used Transport Control Protocol (TCP). Both protocols are supported on the Internet.
UDP is unreliable, and is typically better suited to local communications on trusted
networks. It is more commonly used between IoT devices and gateways rather than directly
over the Internet, although, like all generalisations there are exceptions to this rule. TLS
only works with TCP, and there is an alternative protocol for UDP. Datagram Transport
Layer Security (DTLS) (Rescorla & Modadugu, 2006) provides a mapping of TLS to UDP
networks, by adding retransmission and sequencing which are assumed by TLS. While
the combination of DTLS and UDP is lighter-weight than TLS and TCP, there is still a
reasonably large RAM and ROM size required for this (Keoh, Kumar & Garcia-Morchon,
2013), and this requires that messages be sent over UDP which has significant issues with
firewalls and home routers, making it a less effective protocol for IoT applications (Audet
& Jennings, 2007). There is ongoing work at the IETF to produce an effective profile of
both TLS and DTLS for the IoT (Tschofenig & Fossati, 2016).
A significant area of challenge for network confidentiality in IoT is the emergence of
new radio protocols for networking. Previously there were equivalent challenges with Wifi
networks as protocols such asWired Equivalency Privacy (WEP) were broken (Cam-Winget
et al., 2003), and there are new attacks on protocols such as Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE)
(also known as Bluetooth 4.0). For example, while BLE utilises Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES) encryption which has a known security profile, a new key exchange
protocol was created, which turns out to be flawed, allowing any attacker present during key
exchange to intercept all future communications (Ryan, 2013). One significant challenge
for IoT is the length of time it takes for vulnerabilities to be addressed when hardware
assets are involved. While the BLE key exchange issues are addressed in the latest revision
of BLE, we can expect it to take a very long time for the devices that encode the flawed
version in hardware to be replaced, due to the very large number of devices and the lack of
updates for many devices. By analogy, many years after the WEP issues were uncovered,
in 2011 a study showed that 25% of wifi networks were still at risk (Botezatu, 2011).
Even without concerning the confidentiality of the data, there is one further
confidentiality issue around IoT devices in the network and that is confidentiality of
the metadata. Many IoT systems rely on radio transmission and in many cases they can
be fingerprinted or identified by the radio signature. For example, Bluetooth and Wifi
systems use unique identifiers called MAC address (Media Access Control). These can
be identified by scanning, and there have been a number of systems deployed to do that,
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including in airports and in cities (Vincent, 2013). These systems effectively can follow
users geographically around. If the user then connects to a system, that fingerprint can be
associated with the user and the previously collected location information can be correlated
with that user. In a similar attack, security researchers recently found (Schneier, 2008) that
they could fingerprint cars based on transmissions from tyre pressure monitors, and in
addition that they could drive behind a car and from up to 40 feet away they could signal
to the driver that the tyre pressure was dangerously low when in fact it wasn’t. Such an
attack could easily be used to get a driver to stop and leave their car.
In (Radomirovic, 2010) a theoretical model of traceability of IoT devices and particularly
Radio Frequency Identification Device (RFID) systems is proposed in order to prevent
unauthorised data being accessible. A protocol that preserves the concept of untraceability
is proposed.
Many of the same references and issues apply to section B2 where we look at the use of
digital signatures with low power devices.
C1: Cloud confidentiality
In the main, the issues around Cloud confidentiality are the same as the issues in non-IoT
systems. There are however, some key concerns over privacy that are unique to the Internet
of Things. For example, the company Fitbit (Fitbit, 2015) made data about users sexual
activity available and easily searchable online (Zee, 2011) by default. There are social and
policy issues regarding the ownership of data created by IoT devices (Rendle, 2014;Murphy,
2014). We address these issues in more detail in cell C5 where we look at the access control
of IoT data and systems in the cloud and on the server-side.
A second concern that is exacerbated by the Internet of Things are concerns with
correlation of data and metadata, especially around de-anonymisation. In Narayanan &
Shmatikov (2008) it was shown that anonymous metadata could be de-anonymized by
correlating it with other publicly available social metadata. This is a significant concern
with IoT data. This is also closely related to the fingerprinting of sensors within devices
as discussed in cell A1. An important model for addressing these issues in the cloud are
systems that filter, summarise and use stream-processing technologies to the data coming
from IoT devices before this data is more widely published. For example, if we only publish
a summarised co-ordinate rather than the raw accelerometer data we can potentially avoid
fingerprinting de-anonymisation attacks.
In addition, an important concern has been raised in the recent past with the details
of the government sponsored attacks from the US National Security Agency (NSA) and
UK Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) that have been revealed by
Edward Snowden (Card, 2015). These bring up three specific concerns on IoT privacy and
confidentiality.
The first concern is the revelations that many of the encryption and security systems
have had deliberate backdoor attacks added to them so as to make them less secure (Larson,
Perlroth & Shane, 2013). The second concern is the revelation that many providers of
cloud hosting systems have been forced to hand over encryption keys to the security
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services (Levinson, 2014). The third major concern is the revelations on the extent to which
metadata is utilised by the security services to build up a detailed picture of individual users
(Ball, 2013).
The implications of these three concerns when considered in the light of the Internet
of Things is clear: a significantly deeper and larger amount of data and metadata will be
available to security services and to other attackers who can utilize the same weaknesses
that the security services compromise.
A2: Integrity & hardware/device
The concept of integrity refers to maintaining the accuracy and consistency of data. In
this cell of the matrix, the challenges are in maintaining the device’s code and stored data
so that it can be trusted over the lifecycle of that device. In particular the integrity of the
code is vital if we are to trust the data that comes from the device or the data that is sent
to the device. The challenges here are viruses, firmware attacks and specific manipulation
of hardware. For example, Goodin (2013) describes a worm attack on router and IoT
firmware, where each compromised system then compromises further systems, leaving
behind a slew of untrustworthy systems.
The traditional solution to such problems is attestation (Sadeghi & Stüble, 2004; Brickell,
Camenisch & Chen, 2004; Seshadri et al., 2004). Attestation is important in twoways. Firstly,
attestation can be used by a remote system to ensure that the firmware is unmodified and
therefore the data coming from the device is accurate. Secondly, attestation is used
in conjunction with hardware-based secure storage (Hardware Security Managers, as
described in Deitel (1984)) to ensure that authentication keys are not misused. The model
is as follows.
In order to preserve the security of authentication keys in a machine where human
interaction is involved, the user is required to authenticate. Often the keys are themselves
encrypted using the human’s password or a derivative of the identification parameters.
However, in an unattended system, there is no human interaction. Therefore the
authentication keys need to be protected in some other way. Encryption on its own is
no help, because the encryption key is then needed and this becomes a circular problem.
The solution to this is to store the authentication key in a dedicated hardware storage.
However, if the firmware of the device is modified, then the modified firmware can read
the authentication key, and offer it to a hacker or misuse it directly. The solution to this is
for an attestation process to validate the firmware is unmodified before allowing the keys
to be used. Then the keys must also be encrypted before sending them over any network.
These attestation models are promoted by groups such the Trusted Computing Group
(TCG, 2015), and Samsung Knox (Samsung, 2015). These rely on specialized hardware
chips such as the Atmel AT97SC3204 (Atmel, 2015) which implement the concept of a
Trusted Platform Module (TPM) (Morris, 2011). There is research into running these
for Smart Grid devices (Paverd & Martin, 2012). However, whilst there is considerable
discussion of using these techniques with IoT, during our literature review we could not
find evidence of any real-world devices apart from those based on mobile-phone platforms
(e.g., phones and tablets) that implemented trusted computing and attestation.
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2Named after a character in a book who
exhibits multiple personality disorder.
B2: Network integrity
Maintaining integrity over a network is managed as part of the public-key encryption
models by the use of digital signatures. The challenges for IoT are exactly those we already
identified in cell B1 above where we described the challenges of using encryption from
low-power IoT devices.
However, there is a further concern with IoT known as the Sybil Attack (Douceur, 2002).
A Sybil attack2 is where a peer-to-peer network is taken over when an attacker creates a
sufficiently large number of fake identities to persuade the real systems of false data. A Sybil
attack may be carried out by introducing new IoT devices into a locality or by suborning
existing devices. For example, it is expected that autonomous cars may need to form local
ephemeral peer-to-peer networks based on the geography of the road system. A significant
threat could be provided if a Sybil attack provided those cars with incorrect data about
traffic flows.
C2: Cloud integrity
The biggest concern in this area is the lack of common concepts and approaches for device
identity. Integrity relies on identity—without knowing who or what created data, we cannot
trust that data. We address this in A4, B4 and C4. One specific aspect of trust in cloud for
IoT scenarios is where the device lacks the power to participate in trust and must therefore
trust the cloud server. One key example of this is where a blockchain (Nakamoto, 2012) is
being used in respect of IoT devices. Blockchains are cryptographically secure ledgers that
typically require a significant amount of memory, disk space and processor power to work
(Bitcoin, 2017). These requirements go beyond typical IoT devices and even beyond more
powerful systems in IoT networks such as hubs. One option to address this is to use remote
attestation, but as yet there is little or no work in this space.
A3: Hardware availability
One of the significant models used by attackers is to challenge the availability of a system,
usually through a Denial of Service (Dos) or Distributed Denial of Service (DDos) attack.
DoS attacks and availability attacks are used in several ways by attackers. Firstly, there may
be some pure malicious or destructive urge (e.g., revenge, commercial harm, share price
manipulation) in bringing down a system. Secondly, availability attacks are often used as a
pre-cursor to an authentication or spoofing attack.
IoT devices have some different attack vectors for availability attacks. These include
resource consumption attacks (overloading restricted devices), physical attacks on devices.
A simple availability attack on an IoT device might be to force it to use more power (e.g.,
by initiating multiple key exchanges over Bluetooth) and thereby draining the battery.
Another even more obvious availability challenge would be to simply physically destroy a
device if it is left in a public or unprotected area.
B3: Network availability
There are clearly many aspects of this that are the same as existing network challenges.
However, there are some issues that particularly affect IoT. In particular, there are a number
of attacks on local radio networks that are possible. Many IoT devices use radio networking
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(Bluetooth, Wifi, 3G, General Packet Radio Service (GPRS), LoRa and others) and these
can be susceptible to radio jamming. In Mpitziopoulos et al. (2009) there is a survey of
jamming attacks and countermeasures in Wireless Sensor Network (WSN). Another clear
area of attack is simply physical access. For example, even wired networks are much more
susceptible to physical attacks when the devices are spread widely over large areas.
C3: Cloud availability
The challenges here are not new. Elsewhere we looked at DoS attacks and DDoS attacks.
The biggest challenge here is the use of IoT devices themselves to create the DDoS attack
on the server, as in the Mirai botnet.
A4: Device authentication
We will consider the authentication of the device to the rest of the world in cells B5 and
C5. In this cell of the matrix we must consider the challenges of how users or other devices
can securely authenticate to the device itself. These are however related: a user may bypass
or fake the authentication to the device and thereby cause the device to incorrectly identify
itself over the network to other parts of the Internet.
Some attacks are very simple: many devices come with default passwords which are
never changed by owners. In a well-publicised example (Hill, 2013), a security researcher
gained access to full controls of a number of ‘‘smart homes’’. As discussed above, the Mirai
attack took control of devices that used default or easily guessed passwords.
Similarly many home routers are at risk through insecure authentication (Andersson &
Szewczyk, 2011). Such vulnerabilities can then spread to other devices on the same network
as attackers take control of the local area network.
A key issue here is the initial registration of the device. A major issue with hardware
is when the same credential, key, or password is stored on many devices. Devices are
susceptible to hardware attacks (as discussed above) and the result is that the loss of a
single device may compromise many or all devices. In order to prevent this, devices must
either be pre-programmed with unique identifiers and credentials at manufacturing time,
or must go through a registration process at setup time. In both cases this adds complexity
and expense, and may compromise usability. In Fremantle, Kopecký & Aziz (2015) there
is a proposal for the use of the OAuth2 Dynamic Client Registration (Sakimura, Bradley
& Jones, 2015) process to create unique keys/credentials for each device. In Fremantle &
Aziz (2016) there is a well-defined and secure process for device and user registration that
allows users to take control of devices in scenarios where the device itself offers no User
Interface (UI) or a very basic UI.
B4: Network authentication
Unlike browsers or laptops where a human has the opportunity to provide authentication
information such as a userid and password, IoT devices normally run unattended and need
to be able to power-cycle and reboot without human interaction. This means that any
identifier for the device needs to be stored in the program memory (usually SRAM), ROM
or storage of the device. This brings two distinct challenges:
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• The device may validly authenticate, but the program code may have been changed,
and therefore it may behave incorrectly.
• Another device may steal the authentication identifier and may spoof the device.
In the Sybil attack (Newsome et al., 2004) a single node or nodes may impersonate a
large number of different nodes thereby taking over a whole network of sensors. In all
cases, attestation is a key defence against these attacks.
Another defence is the use of reputation and reputational models to associate a trust
value to devices on the network. Reputation is a general concept widely used in all aspects
of knowledge ranging from humanities, arts and social sciences to digital sciences. In
computing systems, reputation is considered as a measure of how trustworthy a system is.
There are two approaches to trust in computer networks: the first involves a ‘‘black and
white’’ approach based on security certificates, policies, etc. For example, SPINS (Perrig et
al., 2002), develops a trusted network. The second approach is probabilistic in nature, where
trust is based on reputation, which is defined as a probability that an agent is trustworthy. In
fact, reputation is often seen as one measure by which trust or distrust can be built based on
good or bad past experiences and observations (direct trust) (Jøsang, Ismail & Boyd, 2007)
or based on collected referral information (indirect trust) (Abdul-Rahman & Hailes, 2000).
In recent years, the concept of reputation has shown itself to be useful in many areas of
research in computer science, particularly in the context of distributed and collaborative
systems, where interesting issues of trust and security manifest themselves. Therefore, one
encounters several definitions, models and systems of reputation in distributed computing
research (e.g., Fullam & Barber, 2006; Jøsang, Ismail & Boyd, 2007; Silaghi, Arenas &
Silva, 2007).
There is considerable work into reputation and trust for wireless sensor networks,
much of which is directly relevant to IoT trust and reputation. The Hermes and E-Hermes
(Zouridaki et al., 2007; Zouridaki et al., 2009) systems utilise Bayesian statistical methods to
calculate reputation based on how effectively nodes in a mesh network propogate messages
including the reputation messages. Similarly, Chen et al. (2011) evaluates reputation based
on the packet-forwarding trustworthiness of nodes, in this case using fuzzy logic to provide
the evaluation framework. Another similar work isMichiardi & Molva (2002) which again
looks at the packet forwarding reputation of nodes. In IoT, Aziz et al. (2016) utilizes the
concept of a Utility Function to create a reputational model for IoT systems using the
MQTT protocol.
C4: Cloud authentication
The IETF has published a draft guidance on security considerations for IoT (O. Garcia-
Morchon, 2013). This draft does discuss both the bootstrapping of identity and the issues of
privacy-aware identification. One key aspect is that of bootstrapping a secure conversation
between the IoT device and other systems, which includes the challenge of setting-
up an encrypted and/or authenticated channel such as those using TLS, Host Identity
Protocol (HIP) or Diet HIP. HIP (Moskowitz, 2012b) is a protocol designed to provide
a cryptographically secured endpoint to replace the use of IP addresses, which solves a
significant problem—IP-address spoofing—in the Internet. Diet HIP (Moskowitz, 2012a)
Fremantle and Scott (2017), PeerJ Comput. Sci., DOI 10.7717/peerj-cs.114 13/46
is a lighter-weight rendition of the same model designed specifically for IoT and Machine
to Machine (M2M) interactions. While HIP and Diet HIP solve difficult problems, they
have significant disadvantages to adoption. Secure device identity models that work at
higher levels in the network stack, such as token-based approaches, can sit side by side with
existing IP-based protocols and require no changes at lower levels of the stack. By contrast,
HIP and Diet HIP require low-level changes within the IP stack to implement. As they
replace traditional IP addressing they require many systems to change before a new device
using HIP can successfully work. In addition, neither HIP nor Diet HIP address the issues
of federated authorization and delegation.
In Fremantle (2013) and Fremantle et al. (2014) it is proposed to use federated identity
protocols such as OAuth2 (Hammer-Lahav & Hardt, 2011) with IoT devices, especially
around theMQTTprotocol (Locke, 2010). The IOT-OAS (Cirani et al., 2015)work similarly
addresses the use of OAuth2 with CoAP. Other related works include the work of Augusto
et al. (Augusto & Correia, 2011) have built a secure mobile digital wallet by using OAuth
together with the XMPP protocol (Saint-Andre, 2011). In Fremantle, Kopecký & Aziz
(2015), the usage of OAuth2 for IoT devices is extended to include the use of Dynamic
Client Registration (Sakimura, Bradley & Jones, 2013) which allows each device to have its
own unique identity, which we discussed as an important point in the section about cell A1.
A contradictory aspect of IoT Authentication is the proposal to use secure Pseudonyms.
A pseudonym is also sometimes referred to as an Anonymous Identity. Effectively, a secure
pseudonym is a way of a user securely interacting with a system without giving away
their real identity. This overlaps with cell C5 where we look at access control for cloud
systems. We have seen from well-publicised cases that systems may be compromised and
offer personal information, even years after that information was originally stored. In one
case, two suicides have been attributed to an attack that compromised personal identities
(Baraniuk, 2015). Pseudonyms are an approach that can be considered to treat the sharing
of meta-data as important as sharing of data. Also see ‘Three Layer Privacy Model’ where
we look at another model of privacy.
In Rotondi, Seccia & Piccione (2011) a capability-based access system is described that
allows anonymous identities to be used. Bernabe et al. (2014) provides an Architecture
Reference Model for an approach that supports anonymous identities. Neither of these
systems separate the provision of anonymous identities from the data-sharing middleware.
A concept called Zooko’s Triangle (O’Hearn, 2001) proposed that it is only possible to
support two out of the following three capabilities in a system: human-readable names;
decentralised infrastructure; and security. Recent papers, such as Ali et al. (2016), claim
that the blockchain construct proves Zooko’s hypothesis wrong. In Hardjono, Smith &
Pentland (2014) the concept of anonymous identities for blockchains is explored, which
will have significant impact as blockchains become more prevalent in IoT.
A5: Device access control
There are two challenges to access control at the device level. Firstly, devices are often
physically distributed and so an attacker is likely to be able to gain physical access to
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the device. The challenges here (hardware attacks, NAND mirroring, etc.) were already
discussed in cell A1.
However, there is a further challenge: access control almost always requires a concept
of identity. We cannot restrict or allow access except in the most basic ways without
some form of authentication to the device. As discussed in our review of cell A4, this is a
significant challenge. To give a real life example, certainmobile phones have recently started
encrypting data based on the user’s own lock-screen Personal Identification Number (PIN)
code (Schneier, 2014). This guarantees the data cannot be read without the user’s PIN code.
However, using NAND Mirroring, it has been demonstrated that the controls that stop
repeated attempts at PIN codes can be overcome (Skorobogatov, 2016), with the result that
a 4 digit PIN can easily be broken within a reasonable amount of time.
Systems such asWebinos (Desruelle et al., 2012) have proposed using policy-based access
control mechanisms such as XML Access Control Markup Language (XACML) (Godik et
al., 2002) for IoT devices. However, XACML is relatively heavyweight and expensive to
implement (Turkmen & Crispo, 2008), especially in the context of low power devices. To
address this, Webinos has developed an engine which can calculate the subset of the policy
that is relevant to a particular device. Despite this innovation, the storage, transmission
and processing costs of XACML are still high for an IoT device. Another approach based
around a standard called UMA is covered in cell C5.
B5: Network access control
There are a number of researchers looking at how to create new lightweight protocols
for access control in IoT scenarios. Mahalle et al. (2012) describe a new protocol for
IoT authentication and access control is proposed based on ECC with a lightweight
handshakemechanism to provide an effective approach for IoT, especially inmobility cases.
Hernández-Ramos et al. (2013) propose a non-centralised approach for access control that
uses ECC once again and supports capability tokens in the CoAP protocol.
C5: Cloud access control
The biggest challenge for privacy is ensuring access control at the server or cloud
environment of data collected from the IoT. There is some significant overlap with
the area of confidentiality of data in the cloud as well (cell C1).
It is argued in Fremantle et al. (2014) that existing hierarchical models of access control
are not appropriate for the scale and scope of the IoT. There are two main approaches to
address this. The first is policy-based security models where roles and groups are replaces
by more generic policies that capture real-world requirements such as ‘‘A doctor may view
a patient’s record if they are treating that patient in the emergency room’’. The second
approach to support the scale of IoT is user-directed security controls, otherwise known as
consent. This is the approach we take in this thesis. In Tschofenig et al. (2015) a strong case
is made for ensuring that users can control access to their own resources and to the data
produced by the IoT that relates to those users. The User Managed Access (UMA) from the
Kantara Initiative enhances the OAuth specification to provide a rich environment for users
to select their own data sharing preferences (Kantara Initiative, 2013). We would argue
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strongly that this overall concept of user-directed access control to IoT data is one of the
most important approaches to ensuring privacy. In Tschofenig et al. (2015), an approach
for using UMA together with OAuth2 is proposed for constrained devices. This approach
also addresses cell A5. While this approach has a lot of capabilities and power, there is
a slow uptake of UMA in real-world services and even less in IoT. We propose that the
complexity of this approach is the inhibitor to widespread adoption.
Winter (2012) argues that contextual approaches must be taken to ensure privacy with
the IoT. Many modern security systems use context and reputation to establish trust and
to prevent data leaks. Context-based security (Montanari, Toninelli & Bradshaw, 2005)
defines this approach which is now implemented by major Web systems including Google
and Facebook. This is closely related to reputation-basedmodels which we discussed above.
A6: Device non-repudiation
The biggest challenge in the non-repudiation network with IoT devices is the challenge
of using attestation for small devices. Attestation is discussed in detail in cell A2. Without
attestation, we cannot trust that the device system has not been modified and therefore it
is not possible to trust any non-repudiation data from the device.
B6: Network non-repudiation
The same challenges apply here as discussed in cells B2 and, B3. Non-repudiation on the
wire requires cryptography techniques and these are often hindered by resource restrictions
on small devices. In Park, Seok & Park (2007) a non-repudiation protocol for restricted
devices is proposed.
C6: Cloud non-repudiation
This area is unchanged by the IoT, so we do not discuss it any further.
In the previous eighteen sections we have outlined a significant number of threats and
challenges, and used this matrix to assess the most relevant current work in each space.
Before summarising this work, we look at an orthogonal model more closely focussed on
user privacy. This model will be used in later sections to assess the outcomes of this thesis.
THREE LAYER PRIVACY MODEL
One area that crosses most or all of the cells in our matrix is the need for a holistic and
studied approach to enabling privacy in the IoT. As discussed in a number of cells, there
are significant challenges to privacy with the increased data and metadata that is being
made available by IoT-connected devices. An approach that has been proposed to address
this is Privacy by Design (Cavoukian, 2008). This approach suggests that systems should
be designed from the ground up with the concept of privacy built into the heart of each
system. Many systems have added security or privacy controls as ‘‘add-ons’’, with the result
that unforeseen attacks can occur.
Spiekermann & Cranor (2009) offer a model for looking at user privacy. In their model,
they identify three spheres: the User Sphere, the Joint Sphere and the Recipient Sphere. The
User Sphere is completely in the control of the user (e.g., a laptop). The Joint Sphere refers
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Figure 1 Three Layer Privacy model applied to IoT.
to areas that may seem to be in the user’s control, but may have some significant control by
a third-party. For example, a cloud email account may seem like the user can delete emails,
but the cloud provider may in fact back these up and keep a copy. Finally, once data has
been transferred to a third-party, it is assumed to be in the Recipient Sphere, where the
only controls are legal and contractual.
In the model, a device that offers the user full control is firmly in the User Sphere.
However, we would argue that many current devices are actually in the Joint Sphere. This
is where the device appears to be in the control of the user but in fact is in the control of
a third-party. To give an example, the Google Nest device offers users the opportunity to
apply smart heating controls to their house. While a number of user-centred controls give
the user the impression that it is in the User Sphere, there are two key reasons to counter
this: firstly, the data logged by the device is extensive and cannot be controlled by the
user; secondly, the device auto-updates itself based on commands from Google rather than
based on user input (Nest, 2017).
Using this model, we can propose clear approaches that strengthen each of the privacy
and security controls available in each sphere. Figure 1 provides an overview of this model
and its applicability to the IoT domain.
User sphere
Moving privacy and security controls back to the users inherently strengthens the User
Sphere and provides greater choice, thereby allowing more secure approaches to flourish.
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As discussed above, devices need to have secure identities, and currently these are either
not provided, or provided by the device manufacturer.
A second, related issue, is the ownership of devices. The Mirai botnet spread because
dictionary attacks allowed attackers to take ownership of devices. Some systems offer
models of taking ownership securely (e.g., Bluetooth, Near Field Communication (NFC)).
In Fremantle & Aziz (2016), there is a system described where a QR code is used in
conjunction with a Web-based system.
A third issue within theUser Sphere is updating the device firmware. A number of attacks
have originated in lack of updates. One issue is that device manufacturers are incentivised
to create new products but not to update old products. In Tindall (2015), a model is
proposed whereby devices can pay for updates using a blockchain-based cryptocurrency
such as Bitcoin. In the Fremantle & Aziz (2016) there is an approach where IoT devices are
updated based on the secure identity and consent models used in OAuth2.
Joint sphere
Recall that the Joint Sphere is the parts of the system where the user has some form of
control over their data and systems, but the provider also shares control. For example, a
health-monitoring device may upload data to an Internet-based system and then may offer
users controls on how they share data. A major change in legislation around this is the
European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) (European Commission,
2016) which requires much stronger consent controls. Many systems offer forms of user
consent for sharing data with third parties, but these lack significant requirements. For
example, many users are not aware of how to revoke consent. Similarly, there is no clear
place a user can identify all the consents they have approved across different devices.
Consent is not just about privacy. IoT devices often include actuators that can act based
on Commands, and the security of a device includes ensuring that only authorised systems
can issue commands to devices. We looked at consent.
A related area is that of policies. In this meaning a policy is a computer-readable
expression of rights and obligations. For example, a consent approval may refer to a policy:
the user might approve sharing of data to a website based on the fact that the website
promises not to share the data to any other body. Languages such as XACML (Godik et al.,
2002) allow complex access control policies to be encoded in XML or JSON. We discussed
this in cell C5.
Recipient sphere
The Recipient Sphere is the area where the user’s data is now out of their control. Ultimately,
the user must rely on legislation or legal contracts in order to maintain control of this data.
Of course, it is hard to police this recipient sphere: it is possible that the third-party website
will share data following policies. In addition, many organisations have such complex and
poorly worded policies that users are unaware of the rights they are giving up to their data.
Spotting illicit data shares can possibly be done using a concept of a Trap Street. This is the
habit that map-makers have of including incorrect data to see if others copy it. Similarly,
IoT devices could deliberately share incorrect data to specific parties to see if it leaks out
against the agreed policy.
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SUMMARY OF THE REVIEW OF SECURITY ISSUES
In this section we have proposed a widened ontology for evaluating the security issues
surrounding the Internet of Things, and examined the existing literature and research in
each of the cells of the expanded matrix. We have also related these issues to Spiekermann
and Cranor’s Three Layer Privacy Model. This is an important basis for the next section
where we examine the provisions around security and privacy that are available in available
middleware for the Internet of Things.
In reviewing these areas, we identified a list of security properties and capabilities that
are important for the security and privacy of IoT. We will use this list in the second part
of this paper as columns in a new table where we evaluate a set of middleware on their
provision of these capabilities.
REQ1—integrity and confidentiality. The requirement to provide integrity and
confidentiality is an important aspect in any network and as discussed in cells A1–B2
there are a number of challenges in this space for IoT.
REQ2—access control.Maintaining access control to data that is personal or can be used
to extract personal data is a key aspect of privacy. In addition, it is of prime importance
with actuators that we do not allow unauthorised access to control aspects of our world.
REQ2.1—consent. As described in cells A5–C5, traditional hierarchical models of access
control are ineffective for personal data and IoT systems. Consent approaches—such as
OAuth2 and UMA –are a key requirement.
REQ2.2—policy-based access control. As discussed in cells A5–C5, policy-based access
control models such as XACML enable privacy considerations and rules to be implemented
effectively in IoT scenarios, although in many cases models such as XACML are too
heavyweight to deploy into devices.
REQ3—authentication. As discussed in numerous of the cells, IoT systems need a concept
of authentication in order to enable integrity, confidentiality, and access control amongst
other requirements.
REQ3.1—federated identity. As argued in cells A4–C4, there is a clear motivation for the
use of federated models of identity for authentication in IoT networks.
REQ3.2—secure device identity. Managing the security of devices requires unique
credentials to be embedded into each device and secure registration processes as discussed
in cell A4.
REQ3.3—anonymous identities. In order to guard against de-anonymisation and other
leakages of personally identifiable information, anonymous identities/pseudonyms can
offer individuals clearer consent as to when they wish to actively share their identity, as
discussed in A4.
REQ4—attestation. Attestation is an important technique to prevent tampering with
physical devices (as discussed in the cells in column A) and hence issues with integrity of
data as well as confidentiality in IoT.
REQ5—summarisation and filtering. The need to prevent de-anonymisation is a clear
driver for systems to provide summarisation and filtering technologies such as stream
processing.
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REQ6—context-based security and reputation.Many modern security models adapt the
security based on a number of factors, including location, time of day, previous history
of systems, and other aspects known as context. Another related model is that of the
reputation of systems, whereby systems that have unusual or less-than-ideal behaviour can
be trusted less using probabilistic models. In both cases there are clear application to IoT
privacy as discussed above.
While we consider PBD an important aspect, we argue that it is a meta-requirement : it
effectively covers the need to implement the major security and privacy requirements from
the initial design outwards.
There are of course many other aspects to IoT security and privacy as we have
demonstrated in the matrix table and accompanying description of each cell. However,
these specific aspects form an effective set of criteria by which to analyse different systems,
as we show below in the next section.
SECURE MIDDLEWARE FOR THE INTERNET OF THINGS
Middleware has been defined as computer software that has an intermediary function
between the various applications of a computer and its operating system (Hanks, 1986). In
our case, we are interested in middleware that is specifically designed or adapted to provide
capabilities for IoT networks. There are a number of existing surveys of IoT middleware.
Bandyopadhyay et al. (2011b) and Bandyopadhyay et al. (2011a) review a number of
middleware systems designed for IoT systems. While they look at security in passing, there
is no detailed analysis of the security of each middleware system. Chaqfeh & Mohamed
(2012) calls out the need for security, but no analysis of the approaches or existing
capabilities is provided. Atzori, Iera & Morabito (2010) is a very broad survey paper that
addresses IoT middleware loosely. Razzaque et al. (2016) is another wide-ranging survey of
IoT middleware that provides a simple analysis of whether the surveyed systems have any
support for security or privacy, but does not address detailed requirements.
It is clear then, that a detailed evaluation of security in IoT middleware is a useful
contribution to the literature. We therefore identified a set of middleware systems to study.
Middleware review methodology
This set was identified through a combination of the existing literature reviews on IoT
middleware (Bandyopadhyay et al., 2011b; Chaqfeh & Mohamed, 2012; Razzaque et al.,
2016) together with our own search for middleware systems that explicitly target IoT
scenarios. Some of the systems that were included in these papers we excluded from our
list on the basis that they were not middleware. For example, Chaqfeh & Mohamed (2012)
lists TinyREST (Luckenbach et al., 2005) as a middleware, but in fact we considered this
paper to be the definition of a standard protocol and therefore we excluded it.
Our search strategy was to use a search for the terms (‘‘IoT’’ OR ‘‘Internet of Things’’)
AND ‘‘Middleware’’. We searched only in the subject terms and restricted the search
to academic papers written in English. The search was carried out by the Portsmouth
University Discovery system which is a metasearch engine. The list of databases that are
searched is available at (University of Portsmouth Library, 2015). The search was originally
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issued on June 6th, 2015, identifying 152 papers. It was repeated on December 1st, 2016,
and 213 papers were identified, showing a significant growth in IoT middleware papers
over the intervening period.
We thenmanually reviewed the abstracts of the 213 papers to identify a list of functioning
middleware systems as opposed to papers that describe other aspects of IoT without
describing a middleware system. This produced a list of 55 middleware systems.
In our study, we looked for the security and privacy requirements listed in ‘Summary
of the Review of Security Issues’. We also identified if the middleware had a clearly
defined security model and/or security implementation. Out of the 54 middleware systems
identified, we found that 35 had no published discussion or architecture for security, or
such a minimal description that we were not able to identify any support for the selected
security requirements. We label these as non-secured systems.
Non-secured systems
We provide a brief description of each of the non-secure middleware systems:
ASIP The Arduino Service Interface Programming model (ASIP) (Barbon et al., 2016) is a
middleware for Arduino hardware.
ASPIRE ASPIRE Project (Advanced Sensors and lightweight Programmable middleware
for Innovative Rfid Enterprise applications) (Prasad, 2008) is a EU-funded project that
created an open, royalty-free middleware for RFID-based applications.
Autonomic QoSManagement Banouar et al. (2015) offers a middleware that autonom-
ically manages Quality of Service (QoS) in IoT scenarios. While this does address some
aspects related to security (i.e., accuracy and availability), there is no discussion of how
security is handled.
CASCOM In Perera & Vasilakos (2016) a semantically-driven configuration model is built
on top of existing middleware systems such as GSN (Aberer, Hauswirth & Salehi, 2006).
The authors state their intention of addressing privacy in future work.
CIRUS CIRUS (Pham et al., 2016) is a cloud-based middleware for ubiquitous analytics of
IoT data.
Cloud-based Car ParkingMiddleware In Ji et al. (2014) the authors describe an OSGi-
based middleware for smart cities enabling IoT-based car parking.
Context Aware Gateway Anand (2015) provides a reference architecture for using context-
awareness in IoT scenarios. The middleware itself does not address security or privacy and
the authors plan to address this in further work.
DAMP InAgirre et al. (2016) there is amiddleware—DistributedApplicationsManagement
Platform—that can configure systems based on Quality of Service characteristics (QoS).
These characteristics can include security, but the system itself does not offer any security
model.
Dioptase Dioptase Billet & Issarny (2014) is a RESTful stream-processing middleware for
IoT. Dioptase does address one useful aspect for privacy: intermediate stream processing
of data, summarisation and filtering. However, there is no detailed security architecture
and description and the security model is left as an item of future work.
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EDBO Eleftherakis et al. (2015) describes the Emergent Distributed Bio-Organization: a
biologically-inspired platform for self-organising IoT systems.
EDSOA An Event-driven Service-oriented Architecture for the Internet of Things Service
Execution (Lan et al., 2015) describes an approach that utilizes an event-driven SOA.
EMMA The Environmental Monitoring and Management Agent (EMMA) is a proposed
middleware based on CoAP (Duhart, Sauvage & Bertelle, 2015). It does not offer any
security architecture.
GSN The GSN framework (Aberer, Hauswirth & Salehi, 2006) (Global Sensor Networks)
defines a middleware for the Internet of Things that requires little or no programming.
The security architecture of the system is not described in any detail: there are diagrams of
the container architecture which point to proposed places for access control and integrity
checks, but unfortunately there is not sufficient discussion to be able to categorize or
evaluate the approach taken.
Hi-Speed USBmiddleware Augustyn, Maślanka & Hamuda (2016) offers a middleware
based on USB.
Hitch Hiker Hitch Hiker 2.0 (Ramachandran et al., 2015) is a prototype middleware
environment built on Contiki OS.
LMTS In Mhlaba & Masinde (2015) a middleware system for asset tracking (Laptop
Management and Tracking System) is described.
Middleware for Environmental Monitoring and Control Xu, Li & Liang (2016) defines a
middleware for environmental monitoring and control.
Middleware for Industrial IoT Ungurean, Gaitan & Gaitan (2016) describes a middleware
for Industrial IoT based on OpenDDS, which is a middleware that implements the Data
Distributions Services (DDS) protocol. At the time of writing the DDS security model was
in development and hence the architecture does not address security.
MIFIM Middleware for Future Internet Models (MIFIM) (Balakrishnan & Sangaiah,
2016) is a Web Service-based architecture that uses Aspect-Orientation to allow for simpler
reconfiguration.
MOSDEN MOSDEN (Mobile Sensor Data Processing Engine) (Perera et al., 2014) is an
extension of the GSN approach (see above) which is explicitly targeted at opportunistic
sensing from restricted devices.
M-Hub Talavera et al. (2015) describes a middleware for Mobile IoT applications built on
top of another middleware (Scalable Data Distribution Layer). In Gomes et al. (2015) this
work is enhanced to create a middleware for Ambient Assisted Living. In Vasconcelos et al.
(2015) there is another middleware based on M-Hub. There is no support for security or
privacy described.
PalCom Palcom (Svensson Fors et al., 2009) is a middleware designed for pervasive
computing, including IoT systems. It supports ad-hoc composition of services. There
is no discussion of security beyond a statement that traditional security models may be
added in future.
POBICOSPlatform forOpportunistic Behaviour in Incompletely Specified,Heterogeneous
Object Communities (POBICOS) (Tziritas et al., 2012) is a device middleware designed to
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run on small devices. In Tajmajer et al. (2016) there is a description of migrating aspects of
the middleware to a proxy to enable support for smaller devices.
PROtEUS PROtEUS is a process manager designed to support Cyber-Physical Systems
(Seiger, Huber & Schlegel, 2016). It describes a middleware for complex self-healing
processes.
RemoteU¡ Carvalho & Silva (2015) offers a middleware for Remote user interfaces.
SBIOTCM In A SOA Based IOT Communication Middleware (Zhiliang et al., 2011) is a
middleware based on SOAP and WS. There is no security model described.
Service Oriented access forWireless Sensor Networks Fronimos et al. (2016) provides a
service-oriented middleware for IoT and Wireless Sensor Network data.
Smart Object Middleware Hernández & Reiff-Marganiec (2015) describes a Smart Object
middleware based on Java.
symbIoTe In Soursos et al. (2016) a roadmap is laid out for a new EU funded project to
allow vertical IoT platforms to interoperate and federate. There is no plan for security
presented.
Thingsonomy Thingsonomy (Hasan & Curry, 2015) is an event-based publish–subscribe
based approach that applies semantic technology and semantic matching to the events
published within the system.
UBIROAD The UBIROAD middleware (Terziyan, Kaykova & Zhovtobryukh, 2010) is a
specialization of the UBIWARE project specifically targeting traffic, road management,
transport management and related use-cases.
UBISOAP ubiSOAP (Caporuscio, Raverdy & Issarny, 2012) is a Service-Oriented
Architecture (SOA) approach that builds a middleware for Ubiquitous Computing and
IoT based on the Web Services (WS) standards and the SOAP protocol.
VEoT Alessi et al. (2016) describes a Virtual Environment of Things which is a middleware
for Virtual Reality engagement with the Internet of Things.
WHEREXWhereX (Giusto et al., 2010) is an event-based middleware for the IoT.
SECURED SYSTEMS
We identified 19 middleware systems that implement or describe sufficient security
architecture that we could evaluate them against the requirements that were identified
in ‘Summary of the Review of Security Issues’. We describe these systems as secured. In
addition to the requirements identified above, we also identified whether the systems had
explicit support or adaptation for IoT specific protocols: MQTT, CoAP, DDS, Bluetooth or
Zigbee. As discussed above, in ‘Matrix Evaluation’, these protocols have been specifically
designed for low-power devices. We label this requirement REQ7. Table 2 shows the
summary of this analysis.
For each of the secured middleware system we looked at the core published papers and
also examined any further available documentation. Below are the specific details of each
middleware system.
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Table 2 Summary of reviewedmiddleware systems andmajor properties.
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&Cube
In Yun et al. (2015) they describe a middleware, &Cube, that is designed to offer RESTful
APIs as well as MQTT connections to integrate with IoT devices. The system offers a
security manager providing encryption, authentication and access control. No further
details are available on the techniques used.
Device cloud
In Renner, Kliem & Kao (2014) there is a blueprint for a middleware that applies Cloud
Computing concepts to IoT device middleware. A more detailed exposition is given in
Kliem (2015). The approach supports OAuth2.0 to provide tokens to devices. It also
supports encryption and access control. There is no support for summarisation, filtering,
or consent-based access control described in the publications.
DREMS
Distributed RealTime Managed Systems (DREMS) (Levendovszky et al., 2014) is a
combination of software tooling and a middleware runtime for IoT. It includes Linux
Operating System extensions as well. DREMS is based on an actor (Agha, 1985) model has
a well-defined security model that extends to the operating system. The security model
includes the concept of multi-level security (MLS) for communications between a device
and the actor. The MLS model is based on labelled communications. This ensures that data
can only flow to systems that have a higher clearance than the data being transmitted. This
is a very powerful security model for government and military use-cases. However, this
approach does not address needs-based access control. For example, someone with Top
Secret clearance may read data that is categorised as Secret even if they have no business
reason to utilise that data. The weaknesses of this model have been shown with situations
such as the Snowden revelations.
DropLock
In Le Vinh et al. (2015) the authors describe a middleware specifically built for IoT systems
and Smart Cities. The DropLock system is designed to enable secure smartphone access to
a smart locker, allowing delivery personnel secure access to drop off packages. The system
uses secure tokens to allow access to devices. The tokens are passed to the secure locker
using Bluetooth.
FIWARE
FIWARE (Glikson, 2011) is a middleware designed to be the basis of a Future Internet,
sponsored by the European Union under the FP7 programme. FIWARE is one of the few
systems that claim to have used PBD as a basis for design (Vázquez et al., 2011). FIWAREhas
a concept of plugins, known as Generic Enablers (GE). The security model is implemented
through GEs including the Identity Management (IdM GE), the Authorization Policy
Decision Point (PDP) GE, and the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) Proxy. The standard
approach within FIWARE is based on OAuth2 and XACML. It also supports interoperable
standards for exchanging identities with other systems. The overall security design of
FIWARE fits into modern authentication and authorization models. IoT devices are
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catered for in the FIWARE Architecture through a gateway model. The IoT devices connect
to the gateway using IoT specific protocols. The gateway is part of the IoT Edge. This
communicates via the standard FIWARE protocols into an IoT Backend where there are
components supporting Device Management and Discovery. The FIWARE documentation
does not describe any specific adaptation of security or support for security between devices
and the gateway.
Hydra/Linksmart
Hydra (Eisenhauer, Rosengren & Antolin, 2009) was a European Union funded project
which has since been extended and renamed as LinkSmart. The Hydra team published
a detailed theoretical model of a policy-based security approach (Adetoye & Badii, 2009).
This model is based on using lattices to define the flow of information through a system.
This model provides a language-based approach to security modelling. However, whilst this
paper is published as part of the Hydra funded project, there is no clear implementation
of this in the context of IoT or description of how this work can benefit the IoT world.
Hoever, because Hydra/Linksmart is an Open Source project (Linksmart, 2015b) with
documentation beyond the scientific papers, it is possible to understand the security model
in greater detail by review of this project.
The Hydra and LinkSmart architectures are both based on the Web Services (WS)
specifications, building on the SOAP protocol (Gudgin, 2003), which in turn builds
on the XML Language (Bray, 2004). The security model is described in some detail in the
LinkSmart documentation (Linksmart, 2015a). Themodel utilises XMLSecurity (Dournaee,
2002). There are significant challenges in using this model in the IoT world, as discussed
above in ‘Matrix Evaluation’. The Hydra/Linksmart approach also uses symmetric keys for
security which is a challenge for IoT because each key must be uniquely created, distributed
and updated upon expiry into each device creating a major key management issue.
Hydra/Linksmart offers a service called the TrustManager. This is a system that uses the
cryptographic capabilities to support a trusted identity for IoT devices. This works with
a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and certificates to ensure trust. Once again there are
challenges in the distribution and management of the certificates to the devices which are
not addressed in this middleware.
The Hydra middleware does not offer any policy based access control for IoT data, and
does not address the secure storage of data for users, nor offer any user-controlled models
of access control to user’s data.
In Patti et al. (2016) there is a specific instantiation of LinkSmart applied to energy
efficiency in buildings. There is no further extension to the security model.
INCOME
INCOME (Arcangeli et al., 2012) is a framework for multi-scale context management for
the IoT, funded by the French National Research Agency. The aim of INCOME is to fuse
together context data from multiple levels to provide a high-level set of context data from
IoT systems that can be applied to decision making, including trust, privacy and security
decisions. MuDebs and MuContext (Lim et al., 2016) are frameworks built on top of
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INCOME that add Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC) and Quality of Context (QoC)
processing. MuDebs utilises XACML policies to implement ABAC. MuContext validates
QoC and enables privacy filtering.
IoT-MP
The IoT Management Platform (IoT-MP) is a middleware system described in Elkhodr,
Shahrestani & Cheung (2016). IoT-MP offers a security module that implements attribute-
based access control (ABAC) against systems. IoT-MP has a model whereby an Agent is
registered for each class of Things, creating the concept of a Managed Thing. Agents have
unique secure identities. The IoT-MP does not define how devices are identified to agents.
NAPS
The Naming, Addressing and Profile Server (NAPS) (Liu, Yang & Liu, 2014) describes a
heterogeneous middleware for IoT based on unifying data streams from multiple IoT
approaches. Based on RESTful APIs, the NAPS approach includes a key component
handling Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA). The design is based on
the Network Security Capability model defined in the ETSIM2M architecture (ETSI, 2015).
However, the main details of the security architecture have not yet been implemented and
have been left for future work. There is no consideration of federated identity or policy
based access control.
NERD
No Effort Rapid Development (NERD) (Czauski et al., 2016) is a middleware designed for
human IoT interfaces, especially around Bluetooth LE systems and iBeacon discovery. It
does not add any new security measures but uses the existing security models in Bluetooth
and HTTP.
NOS
NetwOrked Smart objects (NOS) (Sicari et al., 2016a; Sicari et al., 2016b) takes an
interesting approach to security where the aim is to provide each item of data with a
reputational score based on a quality analyser and a security analyser. A machine learning
algorithm is used to learn the behaviour of systems in the network and adjust the scores
based on the potential attacks and the applied countermeasures. The system incorporates
keys and key-based authentication, encryption and complex passwords.
OpenIoT
OpenIoT is an open cloud-based middleware for the Internet of Things, funded by the
European Union FP7 programme. It also extends the GSN framework. The Security Module
uses OAuth2 as the main authentication and authorization model for web-based systems.
No details are given of how sensors are authenticated or authorized.
SensorAct
SensorAct (Arjunan et al., 2015) is an IoT middleware specifically aimed at providing
support for Building Management Systems (BMS). It supports fine-grained access control
through the use of a rules engine to implement access control policies. No details are
provided of the authentication models at the device level or the web interface.
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SIRENA
SIRENA (Service Infrastructure for Real-time EmbeddedNetworkedDevices) (Bohn, Bobek
& Golatowski, 2006) is a SOAP/WS-basedmiddleware for IoT and embedded devices.While
there is little description of the security framework in SIRENA, it does show the use of the
WS-Security specification. As previously discussed, this approach is very heavyweight, has
issues with key distribution, federated identity and access control.
SMEPP
Secure Middleware for P2P (SMEPP) (Benito et al., 2009) is an IoT middleware explicitly
designed to be secure, especially dealing with challenges in the peer-to-peer model. SMEPP
security is based around the concept of a group. When a peer attempts to join a group, the
system relies on challenge-response security to implement mutual authentication. At this
point the newly joined peer is issues a shared session key which is shared by all members
of the group. SMEPP utilizes elliptic key cryptography to reduce the burden of the security
encryption onto smaller devices. Overall SMEPP has addressed security effectively for
peer-to-peer groups, but assumes a wider PKI infrastructure for managing the key model
used within each group. In addition, there is no discussion of access control or federated
identity models, which are important for IoT scenarios. The model is that any member of
the group can read data published to the group using the shared session key.
SOCRADES
SOCRADES (De Souza et al., 2008) is a middleware specifically designed for manufacturing
shop floors and other industrial environments. Based on SOAP and the WS stack it utilizes
the security models of the WS stack, in particular the WS-Security standard for encryption
and message integrity. There is no special support for federation, tokens or policy-based
access control (instead relying on role-based access control). The resulting XML approach
is very heavyweight for IoT devices and costly in terms of network and power (Dunkels &
Yazar, 2009). In addition, the lack of explicit support for tokens and federated security and
identity models creates a significant challenge in key distributions and centralized identity
for this approach.
UBIWARE
The UBIWARE project is a smart semantic middleware for Ubiquitous Computing
(Scuturici et al., 2012). The security model for UBIWARE is not clearly described in the
original paper, but an additional paper describes amodel called Smart Ubiquitous Resource
Privacy and Security (SURPAS) (Naumenko, Katasonov & Terziyan, 2007), which provides
a security model for UBIWARE. UBIWARE is designed to utilize the semantic Web
constructs, and SURPAS utilises the same model of semantic Web as the basis for the
abstract and concrete security architectures that it proposes. The model is highly driven by
policies and these can be stored and managed by external parties. In particular the SURPAS
architecture is highly dynamic, allowing devices to take on board new roles or functions
at runtime. While the SURPAS model describes a theoretical solution to the approach,
there are few details on the concrete instantiation. For example, while the model defines
a policy-based approach to access control, there are no clearly defined policy languages
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chosen. There is no clear model of identity or federation, and there is no clear guidance
on how to ensure that federated policies that are stored on external servers are protected
and maintain integrity. The model does not address any edge computing approaches or
filtering/summarisation of IoT data. However, the overall approach of using ontologies
and basing policies on those ontologies is very powerful.
WEBINOS
The Webinos (Desruelle et al., 2012) system has a well-thought through security
architecture. The documentation explicitly discussed PBD. The Webinos system is based
around the core concept of devices being in the personal control of users and therefore
having each user having a personal zone to protect. This is a more advanced concept but
in the same vein as the protected sub-domains in VIRTUS. In the Webinos model, each
user has a cloud instance—known as the Personal Zone Hub (PZH) that supports their
devices. The Personal Zone Hub acts as a service to collect and offer access to data and
capabilities of the user’s devices. The PZH acts as a certificate authority, issuing certificates
to the devices that are used for mutual authentication using TLS. User’s authenticate to the
PZH using the OpenID protocol. On the device, a communications module known as the
Personal Zone Proxy (PZP) handles all communications with the PZH.
The idea of the Personal Zone may have significant issues however, when a single device
is used by many different people (for example, the in-car system in a taxi as opposed to a
personal vehicle). These issues are not addressed in Webinos, though they are called out in
the lessons learnt.
Webinos utilizes policy-based access control modelled in the XACML (Godik et al.,
2002) language. The system pushes XACML policies out to devices to limit the spread of
personal and contextual data.
Webinos addresses the issue of software modification using an attestation API, which
can report whether the software running is the correct level. This requires the device to be
utilising Trusted Platform Module (TPM) hardware that can return attestation data.
Webinos also addresses the issue of using secure storage on devices where the device has
such storage.
While the Webinos project does address many of the privacy concerns of users through
the use of the Personal Zone Hub, there is clearly further work that could be done. In
particular the ability for users to define what data they share with other users or other
systems using a protocol such as OAuth2 (Hammer-Lahav & Hardt, 2011), and the ability
to install filters or other anonymising or data reduction aggregators into the PZH are
lacking. One other aspect of Webinos that is worth drawing attention to is the reliance
on a certain size of device: the PZP that is needed on the device is based on the node.js
framework and therefore the device needs to be of a certain size (e.g., a 32-bit processor
running a Linux derivative or similar) to participate in Webinos.
VIRTUS
The VIRTUS middleware (Conzon et al., 2012) utilizes the core security features of the
XMPP protocol to ensure security. This includes tunnelling communications over TLS,
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authentication via SASL, and access control via XMPP’s built-in mechanisms. SASL is
a flexible mechanism for authentication which supports a number of different systems
including token-based approaches such as OAuth2 or Kerberos, username/password, or
X.509 certificates. For client-to-server based communications, it is not clear from the
description which of these methods is actually implemented within VIRTUS. For server-
to-server communications there is specified the use of SASL to ensure full server federation.
While the VIRTUS model does not describe the challenges of implementing a personal
instance of middleware for single users or devices, there is a concept of edge computing
described, where some interactions may happen within an edge domain (e.g., within a
house) and lower security is required within that domain while higher security is expected
when sharing that data outside. This model is fairly briefly described but provides an
interesting approach. One challenge is that there are multiple assumptions to this: firstly,
that security within the limited domain needs less security, when there may be attackers
within that perimeter. Secondly, that the open channel to the wider Internet cannot be
misused to attack the edge network. The ability to calculate, summarise and/or filter data
from the edge network before sharing it is also not discussed except in very granular terms
(e.g., some data are available, other data are not).
XMPP
The paper (Iivari et al., 2014) describes how the XMPP architecture can be applied to the
challenges of M2M and hence the IoT, together with a proof-of-concept approach. The
system relies on the set of XMPP extensions around publish/subscribe and the related
XMPP security models to implement security. This includes TLS for encryption, and access
control models around publish–subscribe. There is also a discussion about leakage of
information such as presence from devices. The proof-of-concept model did not include
any federated identity models, but did utilize a One-Time Password (OTP) model on top
of XMPP to address the concepts such as temporary loans of devices.
SUMMARY OF IOT MIDDLEWARE SECURITY
In reviewing both the security and privacy challenges of the wider IoT and a structured
review of more than fifty middleware platforms, we have identified some key categories
that can be applied across these areas.
Firstly, we identified the significant proportion of the systems that did not address
security, left it for further work, or did not describe the security approach in anymeaningful
detail. There were other systems (such as UBIWARE and NAPS) that offer theoretical
models but did not demonstrate any real-world implementation or concrete approach.
The next clear category are those middlewares that apply the SOAP/Web Services
model of security. This includes SOCRADES, SIRENA, and Hydra/Linksmart. As we have
discussed in the previous sections there are significant challenges in performance, memory
footprint, processor power and usability of these approaches when used with the IoT.
Two of the approaches delegate the model to the XMPP standards: VIRTUS and XMPP
(Conzon et al., 2012; Iivari et al., 2014). XMPP also has the complexity of XML, but avoids
the major performance overheads by using TLS instead of XML Encryption and XML
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Security. In addition, recent work on XMPP using EXI makes this approach more effective
for IoT.
This finally leaves a few unique approaches, each of which brings their own unique
benefits.
DREMS is the only system to provide Multi-level security based on the concept of
security clearances. While this model is attractive to government and military circles
(because of the classification systems used in those circles), we would argue that it fails in
many regards for IoT. In particular there are no personal controls, no concept of federated
identity and no policy based access controls in this model.
SMEPP offers a model based on public key infrastructures and shared session keys. We
would argue this approach has a number of challenges scaling to the requirements of the
IoT. Firstly, there are significant issues in key distribution and key revocation. Secondly,
this model creates a new form of perimeter—based on the concept of a shared session key.
That means that if one device is compromised then the data and control of all the devices
in that group are also compromised.
Only Dioptase supports the concept of stream processing in the cloud, which we argue
is a serious requirement for the IoT. The requirement is to be able to filter, summarise
and process streams of data from devices to support anonymisation and reduction of data
leakage.
FIWARE has a powerful and extensible model for authentication and access control,
including support for federated identity and policy-based access control.
Finally, the we identified that the most advanced approach is that proposed byWebinos.
Webinos utilizes some key technologies to provide a security and privacy model. Firstly,
this uses policy-based access control (XACML). The model does not however support
user-guided access control mechanisms such as OAuth2 or UMA.
Webinos does support the use of Federated Identity tokens (OpenID), but only from
users to the cloud, as opposed to devices to the cloud. We and others have proposed the
model of using federated identity tokens from the device to the cloud in Fremantle et al.
(2014), Fremantle, Kopecký & Aziz (2015) and Cirani et al. (2015).
The contribution of the Webinos work with the largest potential impact is the concept
of Personal Zone Hub, which is a cloud service dedicated to a single user to handle the
security and privacy requirements of that user. There is, however, further research around
this area: the PZH model from Webinos does not examine many of the challenges of
how to implement the PZH in real life. For example, user registration, cloud hosting, and
many other aspects need to be defined in more detail before the Webinos PZH model is
practicable for real world projects. In addition there are challenges using the PZH model
with smaller devices, because of the requirement to use the PZP.
Overall gaps in the middleware
When we look at the requirements for security and privacy of the Internet of Things we can
see there are some gaps that are not provided by any of the reviewed middleware systems.
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• Only two of the middleware systems explicitly applied the concept of PBD in designing
a middleware directly to support privacy, although Webinos did exhibit many of the
characteristics of a system that used this approach.
• Only two of the systems applied any concepts of context-based security or reputation
to IoT devices.
• User consent was only supported in three of the systems.
• None of the systems supported anonymous identities or attestation.
• None of the systems satisfied all the requirements identified.
DISCUSSION
Contributions
In this paper we have taken a two-phase approach to reviewing the available literature
around the security and privacy of IoT devices.
In the first part we created a matrix of security challenges that applied the existing
CIA+ model to three distinct areas: device, network and cloud. This new model forms a
clear contribution to the literature. In each of the cells of the matrix we identified threats,
challenges and/or approaches, or in a few cells we identified that the challenges are not
exacerbated by IoT concerns. We further used Spiekerman and Cranor’s three layer privacy
model to analyse the privacy requirements of IoT. We used this analysis to identify seven
major requirements and five subsidiary requirements.
In the second part, we used a structured search approach to identity 54 specific IoT
middleware frameworks and we analysed the security models of each of those. We utilised
the twelve requirements from the first phase to validate the capabilities of each system.
While there are existing surveys of IoT middleware, none of them focussed on a detailed
analysis of the security of the surveyed systems and therefore this has a clear contribution
to the literature.
Further work
In our survey, we have identified some clear gaps. Over half the surveyed systems had either
no security or no substantive discussion of security. Out of the surveyed systems we found
very few that addressed a significant proportion of the major challenges that we identified
in the first section. We found certain aspects that were identified in the first section that
were not addressed by any of the surveyed systems. Based on this we believe there is a
significant opportunity to contribute to the research by creating a middleware for IoT that
addresses these gaps.
• To define a model and architecture for IoT middleware that is designed from the start
to enable privacy and security (Privacy by Design).
• Secondly, to bring together the best practice into a single middleware that includes:
federated identity (for users and devices), policy-based access control, user managed
access to data, stream processing in the cloud.
• Thirdly, there is considerable work to be done to define a better model around the
implementation challenges for the concept of a personal cloud service (e.g the Webinos
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PZH). This includes the hosting model, bootstrapping, discovery and usage for smaller
devices.
• Finally, creating a middleware system that applies context-based security and reputation
to IoT middleware.
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